The Truth will prevail, but only if we demand it from Congress!
9-11 Inside Job and Neocons Hacked 2004
|COMPUTER FRAUD ARTICLE 5 5.Machines Never Tested for Penetrability-Bev Harris|
Bev Harris, founder of Black Box Voting, has interfaced with law
enforcement, including the FBI, state attorneys-general, the IRS, local
police, and banking authorities, in several previous investigations
during her work as an investigative writer. Her methods for isolating
fraud have resulted in convictions or settlements from embezzlers and
financial fraudsters. Black Box Voting is the first publicly funded,
independent consumer protection group to investigate this election using
forensic auditing methods.
You may have seen recent stories in the media (ABC News, Salon.com), and
at other voting integrity Web sites like VerifiedVoting.org, telling you
there is no reason to believe suspicions of fraud in the 2004 election.
In fact, no member of the media nor any organization has done any real
forensic auditing to determine whether there was or was not fraud. Trust
in our electoral process is critical to our democracy. We need the right
kind of investigation into anomalies, using appropriate methods.
"Feel-good" statements, dismissive of real concerns into voting
integrity, are not responsible. The truth is what it is. We might see
something very uncomfortable unfold during these investigations. Or,
maybe not. It's still too early to tell, but the evidence is mounting.
Snoopy 50-year-old women
Think of this like an assets investigation in a bad divorce: One party
may have things to hide, the other party (we, the voters) wants to find
out the truth. If you are looking for hidden assets owned by your ex,
you don't call in a computer scientist from a university. You enlist the
help of private investigators, accountants, lawyers, and your plain old
common sense. In fact, snoopy 50-year-old women have proved invaluable
in investigating voting machines.
This is not a computer problem. It is not something a reporter who
spends four hours researching a story can pronounce judgment on. We have
been surprised to see prominent scientists announcing "results" before
the data is in. We don't know what happened on Nov. 2. We will find out.
Here's what Black Box Voting is doing to investigate appropriately:
We are doing forensic analysis of the available evidence. We are
targeting specific locations based on criteria indicative of fraud.
Why we can't disclose our documents yet
Initially, we hoped to have everything public all the time. This
resulted in butt-covering behavior on the part public officials, which
hampered our investigations. Therefore, we adjusted our methods to keep
critical investigations under wraps. That's just the way it has to be
Isn't it too late?
We are dealing with well financed people who are trying to run out the
clock. They probably will succeed in that. However, we probably will
succeed in proving fraud. What we have going for us is this:
- Public outrage: We read your letters and hear your anguish on the
phone. Do not let go of those emotions. Your job is to focus those
emotions into stubborn, relentless, nonstop pressure to make sure that
there will be consequences for any and all electoral fraud.
- Law enforcement. There are still plenty of honest cops. Also, in our
experience, different law enforcement agencies don't always get along,
and where one fails us, another may not.
- We have the courts. (Somewhat.) Not all judges are unfriendly. They
vote too. We can follow the example of tobacco industry lawsuits,
launching many lawsuits, then sharing discovery and strategy until at
last, we prevail.
- We have the media (barely). Network TV has not yet been able to get
its brain around the story of electoral betrayal in a 2-minute news
byte. For the time being, you must be your own "network TV." Don't count
on TV to spread the word. Instead count on America's spirit of self
reliance. We will prevail. Be the media.
- We have the Internet. Use it to share information at every level --
instant messaging, e-mailing, listservs, blogs, forums, Web sites,
announcements, online media, online documents, film and video clips,
audio clips, and any way that you can imagine to use it effectively. The
Internet allows us to respond without boundaries, quickly, in
- We have truth.
# # # # #
SUNDAY Nov. 7 2004: We're awaiting independent analysis on some pretty
crooked-looking elections. In the mean time, here's something to chew
Your local elections officials trusted a group called NASED – the National Association of State Election Directors -- to certify that your voting system is safe.
This trust was breached. NASED certified the systems based on the recommendation of an "Independent Testing Authority" (ITA). "Whuuut?"
What no one told local officials was that the ITA did not test for security (and NASED didn't seem to mind).
The ITA reports are considered so secret that even the California
Secretary of State's office had trouble getting its hands on one. The
ITA refused to answer any questions about what it does. Imagine our
surprise when, due to Freedom of Information requests, a couple of them
showed up in our mailbox.
The most important test on the ITA report is called the "penetration analysis."
The most important test on the ITA report is called the "penetration analysis."
This test is supposed to tell us whether anyone can break into the system to
tamper with the votes. "Not applicable," wrote Shawn Southworth, of Ciber
Labs, the ITA that tested the Diebold GEMS central tabulator software. "Did not test."
Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis?
Apparently not. We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories
report. In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems,
but says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could
continue with the same flaws. At one point the Wyle report omits its
testing altogether, hoping the vendor will do the test.
Computer Guys: Be your own ITA certifier.
Here is a copy of the full Ciber report (part 1, 2, 3, 4) on GEMS
1.18.15. Here is a zip file download for the GEMS 1.18.15 program. Here
is a real live Diebold vote database. Compare your findings against the
official testing lab and see if you agree with what Ciber says. E-mail
us your findings.
TIPS: The password for the vote database is "password" and you should
place it in the "LocalDB" directory in the GEMS folder, which you'll
find in "program files."
Who the heck is NASED?
They are the people who certified this stuff.
You've gotta ask yourself: Are they nuts? Some of them are computer
experts. Well, it seems that several of these people suddenly want to
retire, and the whole NASED voting systems board is becoming somewhat
defunct, but these are the people responsible for today's shoddy voting
If the security of the U.S. electoral system depends on you to certify a
voting system, and you get a report that plainly states that security
was "not tested" and "not applicable" -- what would you do?
Perhaps we should ask them. Go ahead. Let's hold them accountable for
the election we just had. (Please, e-mail us their answers) They don't
make it very easy to get their e-mail and fax information; when you find
it, let us know and we'll post it here.
NASED VOTING SYSTEMS/ITA ACCREDITATION BOARD
(You can find some contact info at this site)
Thomas R. Wilkey, Executive Director, New York State Board of Elections;
email@example.com, phone 518 474-8100, fax 518 473-8315
David Elliott, (former) Asst. Director of Elections, Washington State --
(note from Black Box Voting: he has left and we have been unable to find
his home number. We are very interested in David Elliott, for a number
of reasons. If you can locate his addess, e-mail it to us privately.)
James Hendrix, Executive Director, State Election Commission, South
Carolina; Jreynold@scsec.state.sc.us, phone, 803 734-9060; FAX 803
Denise Lamb, Director, State Bureau of Elections, New Mexico; phone
(505) 827-3620 FAX (505) 827-8403 FAX (505) 827-3634
Sandy Steinbach, Director of Elections, Iowa; phone, (515) 281-5823 FAX
(515) 281-7142 firstname.lastname@example.org
Donetta Davidson, Secretary of State, Colorado;
email@example.com; phone, 303 894-2680 x301 - Fax 303
Connie Schmidt, Commissioner, Johnson County Election Commission,
Kansas; Fax: 913.791.1753 firstname.lastname@example.org
(the late) Robert Naegele, President Granite Creek Technology, Pacific
Brit Williams, Professor, CSIS Dept, Kennesaw State College, Georgia;
Paul Craft, Computer Audit Analyst, Florida State Division of Elections
Steve Freeman, Software Consultant, League City, Texas;
Jay W. Nispel, Senior Principal Engineer, Computer Sciences Corporation
Annapolis Junction, Maryland
Yvonne Smith (Member Emeritus), Former Assistant to the Executive
Director Illinois State Board of Elections, Illinois; phone (312)
814-6468 FAX (312) 814-6485 email@example.com
Penelope Bonsall, Director, Office of Election Administration, Federal
Election Commission, Washington, D.C.; "firstname.lastname@example.org
Committee Secretariat: The Election Center, R. Doug Lewis, Executive
Director Houston, Texas, Tele: 281-293-0101 email@example.com Cell
713 516-2875 - Fax 281-293-0453